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Abstract	
The	 article	 examines	 the	 evidence	 of	 endemic	 financial	 crime	 in	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	
(GFC),	 the	 legal	 impunity	 surrounding	 these	 crimes	 and	 the	 popular	 revolt	 against	 these	
abuses	in	the	financial,	political	and	legal	systems.	This	 is	set	against	a	consideration	of	the	
development	 since	 the	 1970s	 of	 a	 conservative	 politics	 championing	 de‐regulation,	
unfettered	markets,	welfare	cuts	and	harsh	law	and	order	policies.	On	the	one	hand,	this	led	
to	massively	 increased	 inequality	 and	 concentrations	 of	wealth	 and	 political	 power	 in	 the	
hands	of	the	super‐rich,	effectively	placing	them	above	the	law,	as	the	GFC	revealed.	On	the	
other,	 a	 greatly	 enlarged,	more	 punitive	 criminal	 justice	 system	was	 directed	 at	 poor	 and	
minority	 communities.	 Explanations	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 penal	 populism	 are	 helpful	 in	
explaining	these	developments,	but	it	is	argued	they	adopt	a	limited	and	reductionist	view	of	
populism,	failing	to	see	the	prospects	for	a	progressive	populist	politics	to	re‐direct	political	
attention	to	issues	of	inequality	and	corporate	and	white	collar	criminality.		
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Introduction	
The	US	and	global	financial	meltdown	(GFC)	in	2008	was	the	most	devastating	economic	crisis	
since	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s.	It	inflicted	trillions	of	dollars	of	damage	on	the	world	
economy,	bringing	it	to	the	brink	of	collapse.	In	the	US	and	beyond,	millions	of	people	lost	their	
jobs,	their	homes,	their	savings	and	their	hopes	for	a	better	future.	The	repercussions	continue	
to	reverberate	across	the	globe.		
	
The	scale	and	complexity	of	the	economic	and	social	disaster	may	seem	to	overwhelm	attempts	
to	arrive	at	understanding,	 let	alone	apportion	any	responsibility.	One	 thing	however	 is	clear.	
Fraud	 and	 other	 individual	 and	 corporate	 abuses,	 practised	 on	 an	 industrial	 scale	within	 the	
financial	 sector,	 played	 a	major	 contributing	 role	 in	 the	GFC.	 This	was	 criminality	 borne	 of	 a	
culture	 of	 arrogance,	 greed	 and	 impunity.	 It	 was	 the	 product	 of	 a	 world	 in	 which	 financial	
innovation,	calculation	and	manipulation	were	all	but	totally	insulated	from	any	guiding	moral	
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compass.	This	was	due	to	a	combination	of	factors:	the	social	insularity	of	the	finance	sector,	the	
role	 of	 technology	 and	 high	 level	 mathematical	 expertise,	 the	 unquestioning	 faith	 in	 free	
markets	and	the	absence	of	any	meaningful	regulatory	oversight,	to	name	a	few.		
	
Sixties	radicals	have	been	excoriated	by	conservatives	for	decades	now	for	mistaking	freedom	
for	licence	but,	if	such	a	legacy	of	moral	confusion	exists,	its	leading	practitioners	are	surely	to	
be	 found	 not	 amongst	 the	 remnants	 of	 the	 counter‐culture	 but	 in	 the	 ranks	 of	 a	 rapacious,	
amoral	capitalism.	Watching	Charles	Ferguson’s	award‐winning	documentary	on	the	GFC,	Inside	
Job,	the	viewer	is	struck	not	simply	by	the	evident	greed,	wrongdoing,	and	conflicts	of	interest	
but	 also	 by	 the	 uncomprehending	 banalities	 offered	 by	 some	 key	 players	 in	 response	 to	 any	
suggestion	that	corporate	and	personal	conduct	 in	the	creation	of	the	GFC	raised	questions	of	
morality	and	ethics.		
	
This	article	looks	at	the	crimes	of	the	GFC	in	the	context	of	the	politics	of	law	and	order	over	the	
last	 40	 years.	 The	 primary	 focus	 is	 the	 US	 but	 the	 global	 character	 of	 the	 GFC	 and	 political	
commonalities	across	the	English‐speaking	world	(in	particular)	hopefully	make	the	analysis	of	
broader	 relevance.	With	 this	wider	 canvas	 in	mind,	 I	 begin	with	 a	 recent	 case	 that	 captured	
national	political	and	media	attention	in	Australia	in	early	2013.	When	juxtaposed	with	official	
responses	 to	 crime	 and	 abuse	 in	 the	 GFC,	 it	 provides	 a	 remarkable	 case	 study	 in	 the	 social,	
moral,	legal	and	political	asymmetry	that	surrounds	the	crimes	of	business	and	the	crimes	of	the	
rest.	Edwin	Sutherland’s	old	question	–	‘is	white	collar	crime,	crime?’	–	continues	to	hang	in	the	
air	like	a	dark	cloud	(Sutherland	1970,	1949).		
	
Sutherland	 pioneered	 a	 criminology	 that	 was	 humanistic,	 political,	 egalitarian	 and	 populist.	
(More	 will	 be	 said	 about	 that	 last,	 much	 maligned,	 term	 later).	 He	 sought	 to	 address	 the	
mutually	supportive	biases	in	the	criminological	gaze	and	the	administration	of	justice	and	their	
roots	in	inequalities	of	wealth	and	power.	These	concerns	found	a	renewed	political	resonance	
with	the	appearance	in	2011	of	the	Occupy	movement	–	a	mass	popular	protest	at	the	economic	
and	political	abuses	of	the	GFC.	I	briefly	consider	this	development	in	the	following	section.	The	
Occupy	movement	 changed	 the	 ‘political	 conversation’	 in	 America	 and	 beyond,	 giving	 rise	 to	
new	possibilities,	including	in	relation	to	how	we	think	about	the	politics	of	crime	and	justice.		
I	 then	 turn	 to	 a	more	detailed	 consideration	 of	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	GFC.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 an	
attempt	 to	 track	 some	 of	 their	 roots	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 de‐regulation	 and	 unfettered	markets,	
inaugurated	 in	 earnest	 by	 President	 Ronald	 Reagan	 in	 the	 US	 (and	 by	Margaret	 Thatcher	 in	
Britain).	 The	 flip	 side	 of	 the	 ‘Reagan	 revolution’	 was	 the	 growing	 hold	 exerted	 by	 a	 harsh	
populist	 stance	 on	 law	 and	 order.	 This	 produced	 another	 sort	 of	 revolution:	 the	 massive	
expansion	of	 the	US	prison	population.	 I	 try	 to	summarise	 the	political	 logic	at	work	 in	right‐
wing	 populism	 which	 intensified	 the	 inequalities	 in	 both	 society	 and	 the	 administration	 of	
justice,	and	created	some	of	the	essential	conditions	for	the	crimes	of	the	GFC	and	the	broader	
political	crisis	it	brought	to	a	head.		
	
It	 is	 usual	 (at	 least	 outside	 the	 US)	 for	 populism	 to	 be	 tacitly	 dismissed	 by	 academics	 and	
political	commentators	as	an	 intrinsically	reactionary	and	 indeed	pathological	 form	of	politics	
(Roberts	et	al.	2003;	Freiberg	and	Gelb	2008;	Bale	et	al.	2011;	Hartcher	2011:	ch	16).	This	has	
been	 the	 dominant	 underlying	 assumption	 in	 most	 accounts	 of	 penal	 populism	 that	 have	
explored	the	politics	driving	the	widespread	trends	to	penal	excess	in	the	US	and	elsewhere.	I	
seek	 to	 challenge	 this	 view	and	 to	de‐couple	populism	 from	 its	 assumed	natural	allegiance	 to	
conservatism	and	punitive	excess.		
	
This	 is	 a	 necessary	 step	 in	 re‐orienting	 progressive	 politics,	 including	 the	 politics	 of	 law	 and	
order,	 to	 confront	 questions	 of	 inequality	 in	 law	 and	 society	 and	 the	 destructive	 effects	 of	
concentrations	 of	 power.	 If	 this	 is	 to	 be	 achieved,	 it	 will	 likely	 involve	 not	 a	 banishing	 of	
populism	but	its	recovery	and	reconfiguration	for	progressive	ends.		
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Two	laws:	Crimes	of,	and	crimes	against,	‘the	market’	
When,	in	early	2013,	a	young	Australian	environmental	activist,	Jonathan	Moylan,	issued	a	hoax	
press	 release	 relating	 to	 a	 mining	 company’s	 credit	 facility	 with	 a	 major	 bank,	 causing	 a	
temporary	 dive	 in	 the	 company	 share	 price,	 there	 was	 loud	 condemnation	 and	 insistent	
demands	by	business	figures,	politicians	and	the	media	for	him	to	be	criminally	prosecuted	and	
for	 changes	 to	 the	 law,	 if	 that	 was	 necessary,	 to	 punish	 such	 conduct	 (Hamilton	 2013).	 The	
gravity	 of	 the	 conduct	 that	 momentarily	 misled	 the	 market	 and	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 foster	
market	 disorder	 had	 to	 be	 underscored	by	 a	 robust	 statement	 of	moral	 condemnation	 of	 the	
kind	that	only	the	criminal	law	could	deliver.	The	demand	by	business,	on	this	occasion,	to	use	
the	 criminal	 law	 to	 safeguard	 the	 integrity	 of	markets	makes	 for	 an	 interesting	 contrast	with	
typical	 business	 attitudes	 to	market	 regulation,	 let	 alone	 regulation	 involving	 use	 of	 criminal	
sanctions	(Denniss	2013).	Business	regulators	in	Australia	make	sparing	use	of	the	criminal	law.	
In	 the	US	 it	 is	a	striking	 fact	 that	no	bank,	nor	any	senior	banker,	has	 to	date	been	criminally	
prosecuted	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 GFC.	 Instant	 pressure	 may	 be	 applied	 to	 prosecute	 an	
environmental	activist	for	a	minor	stunt	but	failure	to	criminally	prosecute	people	responsible	
for	major	financial	crimes	occasions	barely	a	ripple	of	criticism	in	business,	government	and	the	
media.	 As	Madrick	 and	 Partnoy	 (2011)	 observed,	 ‘The	 [US]	 federal	 government	 has	 been	 far	
more	 active	 in	 rescuing	 bankers	 than	 prosecuting	 them’,	with	 bail‐out	 packages	 running	 into	
billions	of	dollars	of	American	taxpayers’	money.	The	bail‐outs	were	seen	(no	doubt	correctly)	
as	 essential	 to	 save	 the	 US	 and	 global	 financial	 systems,	 but	 they	 carried	 little	 in	 the	way	 of	
conditions	(for	example,	in	relation	to	the	restructuring	of	financial	institutions	or	the	paying	of	
executives	obscene	bonuses)	and	there	was	no	corresponding	housing	relief	or	other	assistance	
for	the	victims	of	the	crisis.	For	the	culprits,	business	as	usual	was	resumed,	including	powerful	
lobbying	against	financial	reform.		
	
There	are	 times	when	a	crime	or	crimes	affords	a	popular	 lens	 through	which	 to	explore	and	
depict	 the	 inner	 workings	 of	 a	 culture,	 whether	 it	 is	 the	 culture	 of	 an	 organisation,	 a	
government,	 a	 sector	 of	 society	 or	 perhaps	 a	 whole	 society.	 We	 are	 more	 familiar	 with	 the	
powerless	–	minorities,	the	poor,	the	‘underclass’,	youth	subcultures	–	being	viewed	in	this	way,	
especially	at	moments	of	crisis.	Criminology	and	sociology	has	produced	an	abundant	literature	
on	 ‘moral	 panic’	 to	 describe	 and	 account	 for	 such	 moments.	 Moral	 panic	 (like	 populism)	 is	
widely	 used	 as	 a	 pejorative.	 The	 terms	 are	 also	 rarely	 used	 in	 connection	 with	 outrage	
occasioned	 by	 the	 wrongs	 and	 harms	 of	 the	 powerful.	 Impunity	 for	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 GFC	
arguably	points	to	more	than	a	profound,	entrenched	 inequity	 in	the	 legal	system.	 It	points	to	
something	rotten	in	the	economic,	political	and	moral	fabric	of	a	society.	It	was	this	something	
that	sparked	the	Occupy	movements	in	the	US.	But	the	manifestations	of	rottenness	in	corporate	
and	political	worlds	are	evident	well	beyond	the	shores	of	the	US:	to	take	just	a	few	examples,	in	
the	media	crimes	of	the	Murdoch	empire	in	Britain	(as	the	Leveson	Inquiry	(2012)	and	analysis	
in	Watson	and	Hickman	(2012)	show,	more	symptom	of	its	corporate	culture	than	any	sort	of	
aberration);	 the	trail	of	death,	destruction	and	corporate	cynicism	left	by	 the	 ‘killer	company’,	
James	 Hardie’s	 asbestos	 industries	 in	 Australia	 and	 elsewhere	 (Peacock	 2009);	 recurrent	
corruption	scandals	involving	politicians	and	business	in	one	society	after	another;	and	patterns	
of	corporate	exploitation	of	 third	world	countries	that	produce	catastrophe	on	a	regular	basis	
such	 as	 the	 collapse	 in	 April	 2013	 of	 a	 Bangladeshi	 garment	 factory	 known	 to	 be	 unsafe,	
resulting	 in	 the	 deaths	 of	 hundreds	 of	 workers	 (Anderson	 2013).	 It	 is	 perhaps	 no	 surprise	
therefore	that	Occupy	and	similar	movements	are	spreading	around	the	world.		
	
Occupy,	inequality	and	the	1%	
The	Occupy	movement	made	its	appearance	on	17	September	2011	in	New	York	with	Occupy	
Wall	Street	and	quickly	spread	around	the	country	and	across	the	world.	It	was	part	of	a	global	
trend	which	had	recently	seen	massive	popular	protest	movements	spring	up	in	the	unlikeliest	
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of	places,	 like	the	Arab	Spring	mobilisations	that	despatched	hitherto	immoveable	dictators	 in	
Tunisia	 and	 Egypt	 to	 the	 sudden	 shock	 of	 their	western	 sponsors.	Time	magazine	made	 ‘The	
Protester’	its	Person	of	the	Year	for	2011	(Time	26/12/11).	The	Occupy	revolt	was	triggered	by	
the	 abuses	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 that	 led	 to	 the	 GFC	 and	 	more	 particularly	 by	 the	 political	
response	 to	 the	 financial	 abuses,	which	 consisted	of	 rewarding	 the	abusers	with	multi‐billion	
dollar	 bail‐outs	whilst	 preaching	 austerity	 to	 their	 victims.	Read	more	deeply,	 it	was	 a	 cry	 of	
protest	 against	 an	 economic	 and	 political	 system	 that	 manifestly	 had	 ceased	 to	 work	 for	
ordinary	people	and	seemed	mostly	to	serve	only	the	interests	of	a	rich	and	rapacious	financial	
elite.		
	
At	about	the	same	time,	figures	issued	by	the	Congressional	Budget	Office	showed	that	income	
inequality	in	the	US	had	soared	in	the	previous	30	years:	the	average	income	of	the	richest	1%	
had	 increased	 by	 275%	whilst	 that	 of	 the	 poorest	 fifth	 had	 risen	 by	 only	 18%.	 The	 share	 of	
national	income	of	the	top	1%	had	more	than	doubled	from	8%	to	17%	(and	a	disproportionate	
share	of	this	went	to	a	super‐rich	fraction	of	the	1%)	whilst	that	of	the	bottom	80%	had	fallen	
(Pear	2011).	The	1%	captured	the	lion’s	share	of	income	growth	(roughly	60%)	over	a	30	year	
period,	with	less	than	9%	going	to	the	bottom	90%,	thus	returning	the	country	to	something	like	
the	economic	and	social	disparities	of	 the	1920s	 (Mishel	and	Bivens	2011):	 ‘In	2007,	 average	
annual	incomes	of	the	top	one	percent	of	households	were	42	times	greater	than	incomes	of	the	
bottom	90	percent	(up	from	14	times	greater	in	1979)	and	incomes	of	the	top	0.1	percent	were	
220	 times	 greater	 (up	 from	47	 times	 greater	 in	 1979).’	 (Mishel	 and	Bivens	2011:	 2).	 Endless	
rounds	of	tax	cuts	and	deregulation	(especially	of	the	financial	sector)	had	roughly	doubled	the	
latter’s	 share	 of	 the	 national	 economy,	 enriched	 a	 few	 almost	 beyond	 belief	 and	 empowered	
them	politically	to	a	degree	not	seen	since	the	early	twentieth	century.		
	
The	GFC	–	its	antecedents,	its	impacts	and	its	aftermath	–	showed	what	these	numbers	meant	in	
human	terms.	The	Occupy	movement	was	 instrumental	 in	 translating	the	manifold	 individual,	
local	 experiences	 of	 crisis	 into	 a	 collective	 understanding	 that	 captured	 popular	 attention,	
thrusting	 ‘the	 inequalities	of	everyday	 life’	 into	 focus	(Chomsky	2012:	9).	The	reductionism	of	
the	99	to	1	was	a	compelling	symbol	that	quickly	entered	the	wider	political,	media	and	popular	
imagination.	Whatever	 the	 direction	 that	 these	movements	may	 take	 in	 the	 future,	 it	 is	 now	
something	 of	 a	 cliché	 to	 say	 that	 they	 changed	 the	 ‘political	 conversation’.	 Polls	 and	 other	
studies	in	the	US	quickly	showed	quite	dramatic	shifts	in	public	perceptions	of	and	attitudes	to	
inequality,	 class	 conflict,	 the	 role	 of	 government	 and	 the	 performance	 of	 political	 institutions	
(Zeleny	 and	 Thee‐Brenan	 2011;	 Morin	 2012).	 They	 also	 showed	 that	 the	 Occupy	 movement	
commanded	 sympathy	 amongst	 a	 large	 section	 of	 the	 population	 and	 across	 the	 political	
spectrum	from	self‐described	liberals,	progressives	and	moderates	(Dionne	2012:	46‐47).	It	 is	
surely	 also	 no	 coincidence	 that	 bastions	 of	 free	market	 capitalist	 thought,	 like	The	Economist	
newspaper	(2012)	and	the	World	Economic	Forum,	recently	elevated	growing	inequality	as	one	
of	the	major	challenges	confronting	contemporary	governments.		
	
The	renewed	emphasis	on	the	politics	of	inequality	is	global	in	character,	even	if	more	muted	in	
countries,	 like	 Australia,	 that	 staved	 off	 recession	 after	 the	 GFC	 and	 have	 not	 experienced	
anything	 like	US	 inequality	 levels	 and	 trends.	What	 all	 these	 countries,	Australia	no	 less	 than	
others,	seem	to	share	is	a	crisis	of	public	confidence	in	their	public	institutions	(government	and	
politicians	obviously	but	also	the	courts,	 law,	the	media,	educational	institutions	and	so	on).	A	
gulf	between	‘the	people’	and	the	political	classes	(broadly	defined)	has	progressively	widened	
over	 time	 (Nye	 et	 al.	 1997;	 Burchell	 and	 Leigh	 2002).	 The	 old	 institutions	 ‐	 political	 parties,	
trade	unions,	religious	organisations	‐	that	mediated	these	relationships	in	the	past,	creating	a	
degree	 of	 stable,	 mass	 social	 adhesion,	 have	 been	 in	 steady	 decline.	 In	 their	 place	 we	 find	
evidence	of	mass	disaffection	 from	the	political	system.	The	Occupy	movement	was	not	 just	a	
reaction	 to	 economic	 recession	 therefore	 but	 also	 to	 the	 ‘recession	 of	 democracy’	 (Chomsky	
2012:	12)	with	which	it	was	seen	to	be	intimately	related:	the	widespread	sense	of	disconnect	
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between	the	lives,	concerns	and	troubles	of	ordinary	people	and	the	priorities,	elite	circles	and	
narrow	managerial	calculus	of	government.		
	
These	 conditions	 tend	 to	 foster	 populist	 political	movements	 of	 various	 kinds,	whether	 from	
above	 and	 aimed	 at	 reconnecting	 electors	 to	 charismatic	 political	 leaders	 (like	 Margaret	
Thatcher’s	 authoritarian	 populism	 (Hall	 1980;	 1983)	 and	 the	 ‘Reagan	 revolution’),	 or	 from	
below	 that	 protest	 the	 failings	 of	 government	 and/or	 business	 elites	 (like	 the	 Tea	 Party	 and	
Occupy	 in	 their	 very	 different	 ways).	 I	 will	 say	 more	 about	 populism	 later,	 but	 one	 striking	
feature	 of	 populist	 politics	 in	 the	 English‐speaking	world	 over	 the	 last	 30	 or	more	 years	 has	
been	 the	prominent	 role	 accorded	 law	and	order.	Rising	 crime	 rates	 and	 the	 supposed	moral	
laxity	of	a	legal	system	fallen	under	the	influence	of	a	new	class	of	social	scientific	experts	and	
rights	advocates	has	been	an	essential	 ingredient	 in	 the	culture	wars	waged	by	 the	new	right	
against	social	democracy,	the	welfare	state	and	the	legacy	of	60s	radicalism.	The	focus	on	crime,	
along	with	race,	immigration,	welfare,	family	values	and	moral	permissiveness,	artfully	shifted	
the	 political	 landscape,	 tilting	 it	 rightward	 and	 away	 from	 issues	 like	 poverty,	 inequality	 and	
corporate	power	and	influence.	The	politics	of	law	and	order	played	overwhelmingly	in	favour	
of	those	seeking	to	roll	back	government	social	provision	and	the	regulation	of	corporate	power	
whilst	pursuing	exemplary	punitive	measures	against	street	crime	and	disorder,	welfare	cheats,	
non‐white	minorities,	the	urban	poor	and	working	class	youth	(Garland	2001;	Alexander	2012;	
Lacey	2008;	Stuntz	2011).		
	
It	 is	timely	to	ask	whether	the	current	moment	might	favour	a	different	sort	of	 law	and	order	
politics,	 one	which	 ceases	 to	be	 solely	 concerned	with	 crime	and	disorder	 on	 the	 streets	 and	
begins	to	politically	question	the	moral	and	legal	 laxity	surrounding	corporate	crime	and	anti‐
social	behaviour	in	the	suites.	If	so,	what	role,	 if	any,	might	populism	play?	Before	considering	
these	questions	it	is	necessary	to	look	more	closely	at	the	crimes	of	the	GFC.	
	
The	crimes	of	the	GFC		
Notwithstanding	the	lack	of	prosecutions,	we	know	quite	a	lot	about	the	crimes	at	the	heart	of	
the	 GFC.	 Charles	 Ferguson,	 amongst	 others,	 has	 detailed	 at	 length	 the	 evidence	 of	 pervasive	
fraud	and	other	crime	within	the	US	financial	sector	(Ferguson	2012;	Geis	2011:	ch	12;	Koller	
2012).	Criminal	activity	was	not	confined	to	a	few	rogue	operators	but	involved	all	the	leading	
US	investment	banks,	other	financial	institutions	and	many	major	foreign	banks.	Ferguson	also	
traces	 the	 historical	 antecedents	 to	 this	 pattern	 of	 criminal	 conduct	 and	 shows	 how	 it	 was	
endemic	to	the	workings	of	the	financial	sector.	The	crimes	he	details	ranged	through	securities	
fraud,	 accounting	 fraud,	 bribery,	 perjury,	 and	 anti‐trust	 violations,	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 Criminal	
dishonesty	 trailed	 off	 into	 other	 deceptive	 conduct	 like	 misleading	 investors,	 betting	 on	 the	
default	of	securities	that	firms	had	sold	to	their	client‐investors,	and	concealing	evidence	of	loan	
defaults,	practices	which,	 if	not	criminal,	were	highly	unethical.	Many	of	 the	same	banks	were	
involved	in	other	crimes	including	bid‐rigging	and	collusion,	tax	evasion	and	money	laundering	
(including	 for	 Latin	 American	 drug	 cartels:	 Taibbi	 2013).	 There	 is	 also	 a	 substantial	 body	 of	
anecdotal	evidence	that	personal	crimes	like	drug	taking,	procuring	prostitutes	and	credit	card	
fraud	were	widespread	amongst	bankers	(Ferguson	2012:	206‐207).	This	is	suggestive	of	a	risk‐
taking	culture	that	traversed	the	public	and	private	worlds	of	work	and	leisure,	albeit	the	risks	
involved	 seemed	 never	 to	 include	 those	 of	 arrest	 and	 prosecution.	 Ferguson,	 with	 some	
justification,	suggests	that	the	financial	sector	had,	by	the	time	of	the	GFC,	evolved	into	‘a	semi‐
criminal	industry’	(2012:	19).	
	
The	 roots	 of	 the	 GFC	 are	 complex	 and	 more	 will	 be	 said	 about	 them	 below,	 but	 a	 crucial	
proximate	 factor	 was	 the	 growing	 use	 of	 a	 novel	 financial	 instrument	 known	 as	 credit	
derivatives	 and,	 in	particular,	 their	 application	 to	 the	home	mortgage	market	 after	2000	 (see	
Tett	2009	for	one	of	the	best	general	accounts	of	the	rise	and	spread	of	credit	derivatives	and	
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their	role	in	the	GFC).	Credit	derivatives	were	widely,	if	erroneously,	promoted	as	introducing	
increased	efficiency	and	stability	into	financial	markets	because	it	was	said	they	dispersed	risk.	
More	cautious	voices	warned	that,	rather	than	spreading	risk,	they	likely	masked	and	increased	
it.	 Although	 it	 grew	 massively	 from	 the	 1980s	 on,	 with	 very	 little	 understanding	 except	 by	
insiders	of	what	credit	derivatives	were	and	how	they	worked,	the	derivatives	market	escaped	
regulation.	 This	was	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 free	market	 ethos	widely	 shared	 by	 the	 industry,	 the	
regulators	(like	the	US	Federal	Reserve)	and	government,	and	the	revolving	doors	that	seemed	
so	 often	 to	 connect	 them.	 The	 spread	 of	 credit	 derivatives	was	 also	 greatly	 facilitated	 by	 the	
progressive	 removal	 of	 traditional	 regulatory	 constraints	 on	 the	 financial	 sector	 that	 had	
safeguarded	against	reckless	lending	practices	in	the	past.		
	
The	 dangers	 increased	 with	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 sub‐prime	 housing	mortgage	 market.	 Sub‐
prime	mortgages	involved	loans	to	high	risk	borrowers	(people	with	little	or	no	capital	and/or	
poor	 credit	 records).	 A	 new	 breed	 of	 unregulated	 mortgage	 lenders	 saw	 the	 opportunity	 of	
making	a	bonanza	from	these	high	risk/high	profit	loans.	The	interests	of	the	investment	banks	
dovetailed	with	those	of	the	lenders,	with	whom	they	worked	closely.	The	banks	purchased	and	
repackaged	the	loans	into	complex	securities	(known	as	collateralised	debt	obligations	or	CDOs)	
before	selling	 them	onto	 investors	all	over	 the	world,	often	pension	 funds,	municipal	councils	
and	 so	 on.	 Both	 lenders	 and	 banks	 had	 an	 interest	 in	 dispensing	 with	 the	 credit	 standards	
traditionally	observed	in	lending,	because	these	 loans	delivered	the	highest	returns	whilst	the	
risks	of	default	were	removed,	or	(more	accurately)	were	commodified	into	a	further	source	of	
profit	 by	 their	 securitisation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 CDOs.	 This	 turned	 incentives	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
creation	and	management	of	risk	upside	down,	initiating	a	vicious	spiral.		
	
The	 frenzy	 of	 predatory	 lending	 entailed	 was,	 almost	 necessarily,	 supported	 by	 systematic	
fraudulent	 practices.	 These	 included	 fraudulently	 inflated	 valuations	 and	 the	 widespread	
forging	of	 loan	documents	by	 lenders	 (all	 to	 the	knowledge	of	 the	banks).	Matt	Taibbi	 cites	 a	
Credit	Suisse	report	from	2006	indicating	that	almost	half	the	sub‐prime	loans	were	fraudulent	
(2012a:	 5).	 Banks	 discarded	 their	 own	 credit	 standards	 and	 internal	 processes	 and,	 in	 the	
relentless	 pursuit	 of	 funds	 to	 keep	 the	 frenzy	 going,	 sought	 to	 circumvent	 capital	 reserve	
requirements	 and	 other	 regulatory	 constraints,	 often	 by	 manipulating	 their	 own	 financial	
records	to	misrepresent	their	exposure	to	risk.	Moving	along	the	securitisation	chain,	investors	
were	frequently	deceived	in	relation	to	the	nature	of	what	the	Australian	Federal	Court	referred	
to	as	‘grotesquely	complicated’	financial	products	(Bathurst	Regional	Council	v	Local	Government	
Financial	Services	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	[2012]).	Information	concerning	actual	risks	and	defaults	was	
actively	concealed	and	the	banks	even	bet	on	the	default	of	the	very	securities	they	were	selling	
to	their	clients	(Lewis	2011).	Ratings	agencies,	chronically	compromised	by	their	own	conflicts	
of	 interest	 with	 the	 investment	 banks	 that	 paid	 their	 fees,	 facilitated	 the	 whole	 process	 by	
granting	AAA	ratings	to	both	the	banks	and	their	inscrutable	financial	innovations.	There	were	
many	 warnings	 as	 to	 the	 risks	 and	 problems,	 including	 FBI	 warnings	 in	 2004	 in	 relation	 to	
evidence	of	widespread	fraud	in	the	sub‐prime	mortgage	industry	(Ferguson	2012:	58‐59),	but	
nothing	slowed	the	momentum	as	long	as	torrents	of	money	were	pouring	in.		
	
Although	there	have	been	no	criminal	prosecutions	of	major	bankers	or	banks,	civil	legal	action	
involving	private	parties	 and	 regulators	 (principally	 the	 Securities	 and	Exchange	Commission	
(SEC))	 has	 been	widespread.	 For	 instance,	 Goldman	 Sachs,	 Citibank,	Merrill	 Lynch,	 JPMorgan	
Chase,	 Bank	 of	 America,	 Citigroup	 (that	 is	 to	 say,	 not	 marginal,	 rogue	 financial	 players	 but	
amongst	the	most	powerful	financial	institutions	in	the	world,	and	the	list	could	be	extended	to	
include	 a	 host	 of	 large	 foreign	 banks	 as	 well)	 were	 all	 involved	 in	 major	 fraud	 and	 other	
financial	malfeasance	that	has	been	uncovered	 in	public	 inquiries,	private	civil	actions	and/or	
civil	 penalty	 cases	 brought	 by	 regulators,	 most	 of	 them	 resulting	 in	 multi‐million	 (and	
sometimes	billion)	dollar	settlements.		
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One	of	the	biggest	SEC	settlements	was	with	Goldman	Sachs	for	misleading	investors	in	relation	
to	 complicated	 mortgage	 products.	 The	 bank	 paid	 over	 $550	 million,	 a	 vast	 sum	 until	 you	
discover	that	it	earned	nearly	$8.5	billion	in	2010	(Madrick	and	Partnoy	2011).	JPMorgan	Chase	
settled	a	similar	action	for	$153.6	million	(Wyatt	2011a;	Madrick	and	Partnoy	2011).	 In	2011	
the	Bank	of	America	paid	$12.7	billion	to	settle	private	claims	brought	against	it	by	de‐frauded	
customers.	 Bank	of	America	 also	 settled	 a	2010	 case	with	 the	 government	 for	 $137.7	million	
involving	 allegations	 of	 bid	 rigging,	 collusion	 and	 fraud	 in	 relation	 to	municipal	 bonds	 sales,	
resulting	 in	massive	 financial	 losses	 to	 local	 government	 organisations,	 schools	 and	 hospitals	
(Washington	Post	2010).	Bank	of	America	was	one	of	 the	 leading	beneficiaries	of	government	
bail‐outs,	 having	 $45	 billion	 of	 taxpayer	 funds	 dumped	 into	 its	 coffers	 (on	 Bank	 of	 America	
generally,	 see	 Taibbi	 2012a).	 Tens	 of	 other	 banks	 were	 involved	 in	 similar	 scams	 (Taibbi	
2012b).		
	
The	 fraud	 and	 malfeasance	 did	 not	 cease	 with	 the	 financial	 collapse.	 Rather,	 the	 frenzy	 of	
predatory	 lending	 gave	way	 to	 a	 frenzy	 of	 predatory	home	 foreclosures,	 roughly	 four	million	
between	 2007	 and	 early	 2012.	 This	 too	 involved	 recourse	 to	widespread	 fraud,	 perjury	 and	
other	 abuse	 (what	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 ‘robo‐signing’)	 as	 lenders	 fabricated	 foreclosure	
documents	 in	 a	 rush	 to	 process	 them,	 on	 occasions	 resulting	 in	 non‐defaulting	 home	 owners	
losing	their	properties.	In	early	2012,	five	of	the	biggest	banks,	including	Bank	of	America	and	
JPMorgan	 Chase,	 agreed	 with	 government	 regulators	 to	 a	 $26	 billion	 settlement	 over	
foreclosure	 abuses.	 This	was	 followed	 by	 another	 $8.5	 billion	 settlement	 in	 early	 2013	 with	
these	same	and	some	other	banks	(New	York	Times	2013).		
	
In	2012	the	Australian	Federal	Court	found	that	more	than	a	dozen	Australian	councils	had	been	
deceived	 into	 buying	 toxic	 financial	 products	 rated	 AAA	 by	 Standard	 and	 Poor’s	 (S&P).	 The	
Court	 ordered	 the	 ratings	 agency	 to	 pay	 almost	 $20	 million	 in	 damages	 (Bathurst	 Regional	
Council	v	Local	Government	Financial	Services	Pty	Ltd	(No	5).	Based	on	the	findings	of	the	2010	
US	 Financial	 Crisis	 Inquiry	 Commission,	 the	 US	 Justice	 Department	 has	 also	 initiated	 a	 civil	
action	against	S&P,	alleging	double‐dealing,	fraud	and	conflicts	of	interest	arising	from	dozens	of	
S&P	ratings	on	mortgage‐based	securities	issued	between	2004	and	2007.	Ratings	agencies	like	
S&P	have	been	aptly	described	as	accessories	before	 the	 fact	 to	bank	malfeasance	 in	 the	GFC.	
Far	 from	 ratings	being	based	on	 sound	modelling,	 they	were	driven	by	 financial	 self‐interest.	
The	banks	were	their	paymasters	(Potter	2013).		
	
The	housing	boom	in	the	early	2000s	did	not	inaugurate	large‐scale	financial	wrongdoing,	there	
being	a	long	history	of	fraud	and	other	swindles	associated	with	financial	crises	(Kindleberger	
1996:	 66‐82).	 But	 the	 boom	 turbo‐charged	 practices	 that	 had,	 over	 the	 previous	 20	 years,	
settled	into	a	pattern	described	by	Ferguson:	
	
...	since	deregulation,	no	other	major	industry	has	broken	the	law	so	often	and	so	
seriously	–	behaviour,	moreover,	that	is	now	rarely	punished.	For	the	last	quarter	
of	a	century	even	highly	criminal	behaviour	has	typically	resulted	at	most	in	civil	
settlements	in	which	the	institution	admits	nothing,	promises	not	to	do	it	again,	
pays	 a	 fine	 –	 and	 then	promptly	 does	 it	 again.	Rarely	 are	 individual	 executives	
even	 sued,	 or	 fined,	 much	 less	 criminally	 prosecuted.	 The	 fines	 are	 generally	
trivial,	 a	minor	cost	of	doing	business,	paid	by	 the	 institution,	or	 frequently,	by	
insurance.	Thus,	while	the	housing	bubble	and	financial	crisis	contain	the	largest	
and	 most	 recent	 episodes	 of	 financial	 sector	 misbehaviour,	 they	 are	 far	 from	
isolated.	(2012:	159)	
	
The	GFC	did	nothing	to	bring	about	an	immediate	significant	change	in	this	pattern.	A	2011	New	
York	Times	analysis	of	SEC	civil	penalty	enforcement	actions	over	the	previous	15	years	found	
51	cases	in	which	a	‘who’s	who’	of	Wall	Street	firms	(19	in	all)	had	broken	antifraud	laws	they	
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had	previously	pledged	in	settlements	not	to	breach.	In	each	subsequent	case,	the	firm	made	a	
further	promise	not	to	breach	the	law,	after	breaking	the	earlier	promises	not	to	do	so	(Wyatt	
2011b).	JPMorgan	Chase	settled	six	fraud	cases	in	the	previous	13	years;	Bank	of	America	and	
Merrill	 Lynch	 (which	 had	 merged	 in	 2009)	 settled	 15	 fraud	 cases	 between	 them;	 Citigroup	
settled	 six	 fraud	 cases	 over	 an	 11	 year	 period.	 Other	 recidivists	 included	 Goldman	 Sachs,	
Morgan	Stanley	and	American	International	Group.		
	
The	 wholesale	 abnegation	 of	 criminal	 sanctions	 in	 the	 face	 of	 repeated	 wrongdoing	 sends	 a	
powerful	symbolic	message	concerning	the	entrenched	inequalities	of	the	economic,	social	and	
political	system	and	 the	way	 in	which	some	–	 the	rich	and	powerful	–	are	above	 the	 law.	The	
announced	need	for	flexibility,	understanding,	negotiation	and	compromise	where	white	collar	
and	 corporate	 crime	 is	 concerned	 is	 a	 form	 of	 moral	 camouflage,	 implying	 (against	 all	 the	
evidence)	 that	 there	 is	 no	 culpability	 (or	 perhaps	 even	 agency)	 involved,	 that	 these	 are	 not	
deliberate	wrongs	but	unknowing,	unfortunate	errors	of	judgment	or	mere	technical	breaches.		
Ironically,	 the	 evacuation	 of	morality	 –	 by	making	 excuses	 and	 refusing	 to	 name	wrongdoing	
and	hold	offenders	responsible	–	is	precisely	the	charge	that	neo‐conservatives	and	free	market	
advocates	 had	 been	 levelling	 at	 liberals,	 social	 democrats	 and	 radicals	 since	 the	 1960s.	 They	
made	a	crusade	of	restoring	punishment,	deterrence	and	moral	turpitude	to	a	central	role	in	law	
enforcement.	Bright	moral	lines	had	to	be	drawn.	They	became	manifest	in	the	popular	currency	
of	 notions	 like	 ‘zero	 tolerance’,	 ‘3	 strikes	 and	 you’re	 out’	 and	 ‘just	 say	 No!’	 (to	 cite	 Nancy	
Reagan’s	popular	exhortation	to	abstinence	in	respect	of	illicit	drugs	(Bertram	et	al.	1996:	111))	
in	the	prevailing	penal	zeitgeist.	How	was	this	seemingly	contradictory	posture	made	possible?		
	
The	‘Reagan	revolution’	and	the	roots	of	the	GFC		
We	now	have	many	valuable	accounts	of	what	happened	in	the	GFC	and	how	it	happened	(Tett	
2009;	Sachs	2012;	Stiglitz	2010,	2012;	Ferguson	2012).	The	GFC	was	no	accident	but	rather	the	
consequence,	 in	 large	part,	of	 the	concerted	de‐regulation	of	 the	US	 financial	sector	over	a	25	
year	period	and	the	expanding	role	and	influence	of	that	sector	in	the	US	and	global	economy.	It	
began	with	 the	 presidency	 of	 Ronald	 Reagan	 (1980‐1988).	 On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic,	
Margaret	Thatcher	(British	prime	minister	from	1979‐1990)	played	an	equally	decisive	political	
and	ideological	role.		
	
In	 Reagan’s	 case,	 his	 political	 rise	was	 itself	 a	 culmination	 of	 sorts	 of	 the	 growing	 hegemony	
within	the	Republican	Party	of	a	southern	and	south	western‐based	right‐wing	populism	with	a	
creed	which	centred	on	market	 freedom,	small	government,	 low	taxes,	welfare	cuts	and	tough	
crime	policies	(Lind	1997).	Critical	accounts	of	the	rise	of	right‐wing	populist	politics	in	the	US	
point	out	that	the	key	to	success	depended	on	being	able	to	constantly	‘change	the	subject’	(Lind	
1997:	 137;	 Berman	 1994)	 from	 economic	 discontents	 and	 concerns	 to	 cultural	 resentments	
over	race,	 immigration,	 family	values,	abortion,	gay	marriage,	public	education,	the	role	of	the	
courts	and,	of	course,	crime.	The	culture	war	strategy	was	one	that	was	consciously	proposed	by	
Reagan	 strategists	 (like	 Lee	 Atwater)	 and	 adopted	 in	 Republican	 political	 campaigns.	
Conservatives	 argued	 that	 core	 American	 values	 of	 individualism,	 free	 enterprise	 and	 self‐
reliance	 were	 being	 destroyed	 by	 socialists,	 radicals	 and	 liberals.	 Although	 the	 political	 and	
cultural	backlash	was	sparked	by	60s	radicalism,	the	roots	of	the	disease	were	said	to	lie	in	the	
New	Deal	order	and	social	democracy,	with	 their	stress	on	government	regulation	of	markets	
and	the	expansion	of	welfare	state	provision.	Avid	readers	of	Friedrich	Hayek’s	neo‐liberal	tract,	
The	 Road	 to	 Serfdom	 (1944	 (1976)),	 sought	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	 evisceration	 of	 post‐
Depression	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 orthodoxy.	 The	 mixed	 economy,	 Keynesian	
management	 techniques	 and	 the	 welfare	 state	 had	 to	 go	 because	 they	 put	 societies	 on	 the	
slippery	slope	to	socialism	and	communism.	In	seeking	to	extend	the	New	Deal	order	to	include	
Blacks,	other	minorities	and	the	urban	poor,	Lyndon	Johnson’s	 ‘Great	Society’	social	programs	
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and	 the	 60s	 ‘rights	 revolution’	 represented	 no	 more	 than	 a	 further	 radical	 slide	 towards	
socialist	tyranny.		
	
The	 events	 of	 the	 60s	 provided	 an	 important	 wedge	 for	 the	 new	 right.	White	 working	 class	
voters	who	 later	became	 ‘Reagan	Democrats’	 (or	working	class	Tories	 in	Britain	or	 ‘Howard’s	
battlers’	 in	 Australia)	 mostly	 remained	 committed	 to	 major	 components	 of	 the	 social	
democratic	 state,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 even	 ideological	 leaders	 like	 Thatcher	 and	
Reagan	 drew	 a	 pragmatic	 line	 at	 destroying	 many	 of	 them	 (the	 National	 Health	 Service	 in	
Britain,	social	security	and	even	key	Johnson	initiatives	like	Medicare	in	the	US).	However,	when	
persuaded	 that	 their	 hard‐earned	 taxes	 were	 being	 wasted	 by	 government	 on	 failed	 special	
programs	for	undeserving	minorities,	 ‘welfare	mothers’	and	criminals	whilst	the	 interests	and	
values	of	 the	 solid,	 thrifty,	 law‐abiding	mainstream	were	being	overlooked,	 the	possibility	 for	
fundamental	political	realignments	did	arise.	So,	it	was	argued,	ordinary,	hard‐working	people	
were	not	only	victims	of	rising	rates	of	street	crime	but	also	of	government	neglect,	insensitivity	
and	 arrogance,	 a	 moral	 trashing	 of	 their	 values	 and	 a	misuse	 of	 their	 taxes	 to	 subsidise	 the	
lifestyles	of	 the	unfit	and	undeserving.	Representing	government	programs	 for	minorities,	 the	
urban	 poor	 and	 other	 socially	 excluded	 groups	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 crime	 and	welfare	 thus	
allowed	for	a	much	broader	based	assault	on	‘big	government’	and	its	‘tax	and	spend’	policies.		
Crime	became	 a	pivotal	 issue	 for	 right‐wing	populist	 politics	because	 it	 could	knit	 together	 a	
variety	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	 grievances	 and	 anxieties,	 beyond	 any	 concern	 about	 crime.	 The	
problem	was	not	 just	 rising	 crime	 rates	 but	 also	 that	 governments	 and	a	new	class	 of	 liberal	
experts	 appeared	 to	 be	 more	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 criminal	 than	 the	 victims.	 Their	 value‐free	
structural	 and	 social	 explanations	 provided	 excuses	 for	 wrongdoing	 and	 dispensed	 with	
morality	 and	 personal	 responsibility.	 They	 encouraged	 instead	 a	 sense	 of	 entitlement	 and	
fostered	a	culture	of	dependency.	The	problem	was	not	economic	and	social	exclusion	but	the	
repudiation	 of	 moral	 responsibility,	 self‐reliance	 and	 the	 work	 ethic	 (see	 Katz	 1989	 for	 an	
account	of	this	turn	in	political	and	public	policy	discourse).		
	
For	the	conservative	right,	the	solution	lay	in	restoring	the	discipline	of	the	market.	Individuals	
would	be	taught	that	material	reward	and	self‐improvement	came	only	with	effort,	hard	work	
and	thrift	and	that	there	was	no	place	for	sponging	off	the	state	or	one’s	fellow	citizens.	But	the	
moral	 foundations	 of	 society	 having	 been	weakened	under	 the	 influence	 of	misguided	 liberal	
policies	and	attitudes,	it	was	also	necessary	to	fortify	the	state	in	its	traditional	role	of	guardian	
of	law	and	order	and	national	security	by	strengthening	its	policing	and	penal	arms.		
	
When	the	cultural	discontents	of	the	60s	and	70s	converged	with	the	tax	revolt	at	the	end	of	the	
70s,	 the	 scene	 was	 set	 for	 the	 Reagan	 and	 Thatcher	 revolutions.	 The	 governing	 philosophy	
guiding	these	revolutions	was	summed	up	in	Ronald	Reagan’s	Inaugural	Address	as	President	in	
January	1981:		
	
In	the	present	crisis,	government	is	not	the	solution	to	our	problem;	government	
is	the	problem.	
	
The	 crisis	 was	 also	 economic.	 If	 deficits	 and	 inflation	 could	 be	 blamed	 on	 big‐spending	
government	 that	 threw	 the	 hard‐earned	money	 of	 tax	 payers	 at	 undeserving	 and	 ungrateful	
minorities,	and	then	only	to	worsen	rather	than	remedy	problems	like	crime	and	poverty,	this	
opened	the	way	to	a	virtuous	roll‐back	of	the	state	in	favour	of	unfettered	market	forces.		
	
In	the	event,	Reagan	rolled	back	the	state	in	many	areas	although	he	also	contributed	to	future	
deficits	 through	 massive	 increases	 in	 military	 spending.	 And	 notwithstanding	 his	 populist	
rhetoric,	Reagan’s	policies	overwhelmingly	favoured	business	and	the	wealthy.	Most	of	the	tax	
cuts	 went	 to	 the	 rich.	 Together	 with	 de‐regulatory	 policies,	 this	 contributed	 to	 the	 ever‐
widening	gap	between	rich	and	poor	in	the	following	three	decades	(Berman	1994:	92).	The	de‐
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regulation	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 initiated	 by	 Reagan	 and	 continued	 with	 gusto	 by	 his	
successors,	 including	Bill	Clinton,	had	 far‐reaching	consequences	 (Ferguson	2012:	ch	2;	Sachs	
2012:	ch	4,	esp	61‐62).		
	
Traditional	 controls	 on	 banking,	 like	 the	 New	 Deal‐era	 Glass‐Steagall	 Act,	 1933	 (which	 was	
weakened	 by	 Reagan	 and	 ultimately	 repealed	 by	 Clinton),	 were	 designed	 to	 ensure	 prudent	
lending	practices	by	restricting	 the	size	of	banks,	by	erecting	walls	within	 the	 financial	 sector	
(between	 commercial	 banking,	 investment	 banking,	 home	 lending	 and	 insurance),	 and	 by	
limiting	the	capacity	of	banks	to	engage	in	speculative	investments	with	others	people’s	money.	
The	sector	was	tightly	regulated.	To	be	sure,	de‐regulation	was	not	the	only	force	at	work	in	the	
progressive	financialisation	of	the	US	(and	global)	economies.	There	were	also	the	accumulating	
economic	pressures	from	the	appearance	of	‘stagflation’	and	the	oil	shocks	in	the	1970s	and	the	
far‐reaching	impact	of	new	technologies.	But,	as	Ferguson	put	it,	de‐regulation	had	the	effect	of	
‘putting	 the	 inmates	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 asylum’	 (2012:	 30).	 Relaxation	 of	 controls	 saw	 bank	
mergers,	the	rise	of	vastly	bigger,	more	aggressive	banks	and	a	much	enlarged	financial	sector	
with	 enormous	 economic	 power.	 This	 in	 turn	 translated	 into	 overweening	 political	 influence	
exerted	through	industry	lobbying	capacity	(three	lobbyists	for	every	elected	US	representative,	
according	to	some	accounts),	through	campaign	financing,	and	through	the	constant	exchange	of	
personnel	as	between	the	senior	ranks	of	Wall	Street,	government	and	the	regulatory	agencies.	
It	meant	 that,	 in	 the	 teeth	of	 rapid	growth	and	change	 involving	 the	advent	of	 complex,	 risky	
financial	 innovations	 like	 for	 example	 derivatives	 (described	 by	 Warren	 Buffet	 as	 ‘financial	
weapons	of	mass	destruction’),	doctrinaire	adherence	to	free	market	abstractions	peremptorily	
ruled	out	any	consideration	of	regulation.		
	
This	was	a	case	of	money	taking	over	politics	or,	in	a	word,	plutocracy.	Such	a	level	of	capture	
meant	that	industries	effectively	wrote	their	own	laws	and	rules.	As	Stiglitz	(2012)	and	others	
show,	the	relentless	push	for	yet	further	de‐regulation	frequently	had	little	to	do	with	drives	for	
efficiency	and	productivity,	and	everything	to	do	with	the	abuse	of	monopoly	economic	power	
in	the	service	of	rent‐seeking	and	the	creation	of	a	weak	framework	of	laws.	When	governments	
offer	 resistance,	 they	 are	 loudly	 accused	of	 being	 ‘anti‐business’,	 of	 engaging	 in	 ‘class	war’	 or	
undermining	‘market	confidence’.		
	
Reagan	succeeded	in	executing	the	‘culture	war’	strategy	of	‘changing	the	subject’,	of	‘redirecting	
populist	resentment	of	the	rich	toward	a	governmental	establishment	that	supported	a	 liberal	
social	and	cultural	agenda’	(Berman	1994:	3).	Under	cover	of	returning	power	from	government	
to	the	people,	Reagan	actually	handed	power	and	wealth	on	a	massive	scale	to	business	and	the	
rich.	Margaret	Thatcher	prosecuted	a	similar	strategy	in	Britain.	Centre‐left	politicians	in	the	US	
and	elsewhere	 (Tony	Blair	 in	Britain	and,	 sometimes	with	 less	enthusiasm	and	more	balance,	
state	and	federal	Labor	leaders	in	Australia)	adjusted	to	the	new	free	market	dispensation	and	
political	 outlook:	 light	 touch	 regulation	 of	 the	 economy	 coupled	 with	 a	 much	 tougher,	 more	
punitive	attitude	to	welfare	and	crime.		
	
The	record	of	the	US	on	crime	and	punishment	speaks	for	itself:	the	reflex	political	commitment	
to	harsh	rhetoric	and	harsh	policies	led	to	a	five‐fold	increase	in	the	national	imprisonment	rate	
in	the	30	years	after	the	mid‐70s,	giving	the	US	the	dubious	honour	of	having	more	of	its	citizens	
in	 prison	 per	 capita	 than	 any	 other	 nation	 in	 the	 world.	 Other	 countries,	 particularly	 in	 the	
Anglo	 world,	 followed	 suit,	 greatly	 expanding	 their	 penal	 systems	 (if	 nowhere	 to	 the	 same	
degree	as	 the	US)	and	elevating	penal	severity	as	a	core	 litmus	 test	of	political	resolution	and	
legitimacy.		
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Crime	and	populist	politics	
The	concept	of	penal	populism	has	assumed	an	important	role	in	explanations	of	penal	excess	
and	the	growing	criminalisation	of	the	poor	and	minorities	(Bottoms	1995;	Garland	2001:	13;	
Roberts	et	al.	2003;	Pratt	2006;	Freiberg	and	Gelb	2008).	In	most	accounts,	populism	is	seen	as	
intrinsically	 punitive	 in	 nature.	 It	 serves	 the	 interests	 of	 political	 leaders	 to	 channel	 the	
discontents	 of	 ordinary	 people	 into	 demands	 for	 tougher	 measures	 against	 symbolic	 ‘folk	
devils’,	 like	black	street	offenders,	welfare	cheats	and	 illegal	 immigrants,	and	away	 from	their	
real	and	complex	causes	in	declining	economic	security	and	rising	inequality.	It	also	provides	an	
explanation	for	how,	ideologically	and	politically,	the	fundamental	inequities	of	the	legal	system	
are	legitimated	as	the	public	gaze	is	diverted	from	the	pervasive,	calculated	and	harmful	crimes	
of	 business	 and	 corporations.	 The	 populist	 politics	 of	 the	 American	 right	 since	 the	 1960s	
adopted	 this	 as	 a	 conscious	 political	 strategy,	 one	 that	 successfully	 shifted	 public	 debate	
rightward	and	thus	ensnared	the	centre	left.		
	
There	is	a	problem,	however,	in	treating	the	connection	between	populism	on	the	one	hand,	and	
conservatism	 and	 punitiveness	 on	 the	 other,	 as	 essential	 rather	 than	 contingent.	 Elsewhere	 I	
have	relied	on	 the	theoretical	analysis	of	Ernesto	Laclau	(2007)	to	develop	the	argument	 that	
populism	needs	to	be	de‐coupled	 from	punitiveness	and,	 indeed,	 from	any	necessary	social	or	
ideological	belonging	or	 content,	 and	 taken	seriously	as	 a	political	 rationality	 in	 its	own	 right	
(Hogg	 2013).	 Instead	 of	 being	 seen	 as	 a	 perversion	 of	 democracy,	 it	 should	be	 regarded	 as	 a	
regular,	meaningful,	 ‘normal’	dimension	of	political	practice.	To	assume	the	Olympian	attitude,	
so	prevalent	in	casual	academic	and	political	critique,	that	populism	only	has	to	be	named	to	be	
exposed	as	a	dangerous	political	aberration	and	sham,	is	to	reproduce	the	very	political	habits	
and	prejudices	(elitism,	rationalism,	intellectualism)	that	populism	so	successfully	attacks.		
	
Populists	 (self‐described	or	otherwise)	 typically	 call	 for	power	 to	be	 returned	 to	 ‘the	people’.	
This	 of	 course	 begs	 obvious	 questions.	 More	 accurately,	 what	 populist	 movements	 and	
interventions	 are	 engaged	 in	 when	 they	 make	 such	 appeals	 is	 a	 process	 of	 constituting	 ‘the	
people’	 as	 a	 political	 identity	 and	 active	 political	 force.	 It	 almost	 goes	 with	 saying	 that	 ‘the	
people’	 in	question	 are	not	 the	people	as	 a	whole	or	 even	necessarily	 a	majority	 or	plurality.	
Populism	operates	in	the	space	that	invariably	exists	between	the	(heterogeneous,	fragmented,	
inarticulate)	 claims	 and	 desires	 of	 people	 within	 a	 political	 formation	 and	 that	 formation’s	
power	 structures,	 working	 to	 convert	 disparate	 disaffection	 into	 an	 organised	 political	
movement.	 The	 people	 in	 question	 tend	 to	 be	 those	who	 are,	 or	 see	 themselves,	 as	 normally	
outside	politics,	as	without	a	voice	in	the	halls	of	power	and	in	organised	interests	and	lobbies.	
More	 than	 this,	populist	 interventions	 represent	 ‘the	people’	 as	victims	of	a	 system	of	power,	
which	is	either	corrupt	or	indifferent	to	their	needs	and	values.	Populist	mobilisations	therefore	
tend	to	be	organised	around	a	sharply	drawn	principle	of	social	antagonism.	It	is	important	to	
recognise	also	that	the	psycho‐social	processes	involved	are	not	necessarily	logical	in	nature	or	
simply	 interest‐	 or	 ideas‐based,	 but	 commonly	 depend	 on	 non‐rational,	 affective,	 political	
identifications	with	a	movement,	leaders,	symbols	and	ideas.	Those	who	see	this	as	dangerous	
are	doubtless	correct	but	they	overlook	the	fact	that	it	is	a	danger	inherent	in	all	politics	because	
affective	appeal	is	integral	to	politics.		
	
Truncated	as	this	summary	of	more	complex	arguments	is,	I	hope	it	suffices	to	rescue	populism	
from	its	 fate	as	political	aberration.	Taking	 the	populism	in	penal	populism	seriously	requires	
thought	to	be	given	to	what	a	progressive	populism	around	law	and	order	might	look	like.	Ideas	
around	 restorative	 justice	 and	 justice	 reinvestment,	 for	 example	 (Brown	 2013;	 Hogg	 2013),	
provide	promising	avenues	for	progressives	to	popularly	contest	punitive	agendas.	I	want	also	
to	suggest	that	a	progressive	populism	might	direct	far	greater	attention	to	corporate	and	white	
collar	crime,	revisiting	and	developing	the	legacy	of	Edwin	Sutherland’s	criminology.	This	would	
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complement	the	broader	political	goal	of	confronting	inequality	and	plutocracy	that	movements	
like	Occupy	have	firmly	placed	back	on	the	public	agenda.		
	
Populism	and	corporate	and	white	collar	crime	
Edwin	 Sutherland	 was	 not	 the	 first	 thinker	 to	 highlight	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 business	 crimes	
amongst	the	well‐do‐to	and	outwardly	respectable	classes.	In	his	pioneering	sociological	study,	
The	 Philadelphia	Negro	 (1899),	 published	 many	 decades	 before	 Sutherland’s	 time,	 the	 Afro‐
American	sociologist	and	activist	WEB	Du	Bois	explained	that	the	over‐representation	of	Black	
Americans	in	prisons	was	due	in	part	to	the	legal	impunity	enjoyed	by	the	crimes	of	the	white	
business	class.	Other	 scholar‐activists	and	writers	 in	 the	early	 ‘muck‐raking’	 tradition,	 figures	
like	 EA	 Ross	 and	 Upton	 Sinclair	 (1906),	 also	 drew	 public	 attention	 to	 the	 crimes	 and	 harms	
perpetrated	by	business,	as	did	early	populist	political	movements	in	the	US	and	Australia	(Love	
1984).	But	it	was	Sutherland	who	successfully	popularised	the	term	‘white	collar	crime’	in	and	
after	his	1939	presidential	address	to	a	joint	meeting	of	the	American	Sociological	Association	
and	the	American	Economic	Association.	And	before	and	since,	evidence	of	harms	perpetrated	
by	corporations	and	wealthy	and	powerful	business	people	has	not	been	 lacking	 (Geis	2011).	
Sutherland,	and	many	of	the	criminologists	who	followed	his	lead	in	researching	and	theorising	
around	crimes	of	the	powerful,	conceived	the	project	in	broadly	political,	as	well	as	intellectual,	
terms.	They	 aimed	 to	 expose	 the	highly	 selective	 (and	 thus	ultimately	political)	nature	of	 the	
criminal	 process,	 to	 redress	manifest	 biases	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 scale	 and	 impact	 of	
corporate	 and	 white	 collar	 crimes	 and	 harms,	 and	 (and	 most	 ambitiously)	 to	 tackle	 the	
inequalities	in	wealth	and	power	that	underpinned	a	system	in	which	harm	was	perpetrated	on	
a	large	scale	but	responsibility	for	it	effectively	denied	or	deflected.	This	tradition	has	produced	
an	 impressive	 body	 of	 research	 and	 theory,	 and	 notched	 up	 significant	 policy	 achievements.	
Many	of	 these	achievements	 lie	 in	 the	 field	of	 improved	 regulation	of	 corporate	and	business	
activity.	This	 is	not	 to	be	dismissed,	but	 it	does	 tend	to	underline	 that	 there	has	been	 far	 less	
success	on	the	larger	political,	social	and	moral	questions	posed	by	the	selective	criminalisation	
of	working	class	crime	and	the	pervasive	legal	and	moral	ambiguity	(and	often	straightforward	
impunity)	 surrounding	 business	 malfeasance;	 and	 illustrate	 how	 these	 relate	 to	 systemic	
economic,	social	and	political	inequalities.		
	
America	 is	 perhaps	 the	 one	 country	 in	which	 the	 term	 populism	 is	 openly	 embraced	 and	 in	
which	 it	 carries	 positive	 overtones,	 especially	 on	 the	 left	 or	 progressive	 side	 of	 politics.	 This	
stretches	back	to	the	emergence	of	the	self‐described	populist	movement	in	the	late	nineteenth	
century.	It	began	with	the	agrarian	revolt	and	saw	the	establishment	of	the	People’s	Party	as	a	
formidable	third	party	force	 in	the	1880s	and	90s	which	won	state	and	local	political	office	in	
many	 parts	 of	 the	 south	 and	west	 and	 secured	 over	 a	million	 votes	 in	 the	 1892	 presidential	
election	 before	 supporting	 Democrat	 William	 Jennings	 Bryan	 in	 the	 1896	 presidential	 race	
(Goodwyn	1976;	Kazin	 1998).	 The	 agrarian	 revolt	 saw	 farmers	 join	 forces	with	workers	 and	
radical	intellectuals	to	defend	the	interests	of	the	common	people	against	the	big	financial,	rail	
and	 other	 corporations	 whose	 rapidly	 growing	 wealth	 and	 influence	 in	 the	 ‘gilded	 age’	 of	
unregulated	 US	 capitalism	was	 used	 to	mercilessly	 exploit	 and	 oppress	 small	 producers	 and	
workers	and	to	dominate	and	corrupt	the	political	process.	The	vision,	goals	and	methods	of	the	
populists	have	exerted	a	continuing	influence	on	American	left	and	progressive	politics	(Kazin	
1998;	 Dionne	 2012;	 Boyte	 and	 Riesssman	 1986).	 But,	 as	 Kazin	 shows,	 in	 confirmation	 that	
populist	politics	have	no	essential	ideological	or	social	underpinnings	or	content,	populism	was	
for	 much	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 a	 feature	 of	 right	 wing	 movements	 in	 the	 US,	 including	
McCarthyism,	 the	 Goldwater	 insurgency	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party	 in	 the	 1960s,	 the	 George	
Wallace‐led	backlash	against	 civil	 rights	and	desegregation,	 the	Reagan	ascendancy	and,	most	
recently,	the	Tea	Party.		
	
Russell	Hogg:	Populism,	Law	and	Order	and	the	Crimes	of	the	1%	
	
IJCJ				125	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(1)	
Interestingly,	Gil	Geis	(2011:	5‐6;	also	see	Shover	and	Cullen	2008)	has	recently	suggested	that	
Edwin	Sutherland’s	political	education	and	his	interest	in	white	collar	crime	were	shaped	by	the	
populist	 milieu	 of	 Nebraska	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries	 in	 which	
Sutherland	grew	up,	Nebraska	being	one	of	the	populist	strongholds	at	the	time	and	the	home	
state	of	William	Jennings	Bryan.	Whatever	 the	direct	 influence	of	populism	on	Sutherland,	his	
approach	 to	white	 collar	 crime	 resonates	powerfully	with	 the	 concerns	of	 the	populists	 in	 its	
rejection	of	received	legal	categories	of	crime,	its	explicit	concern	with	the	political	character	of	
crime	 definitions,	 and	 its	 central	 preoccupation	 with	 the	 corporate	 setting	 and	 respectable	
upper	 class	 status	of	white	 collar	offenders	 (and	 thus	with	questions	of	 power	 and	economic	
inequality).	 This	 led	 Shover	 and	 Cullen	 (2008)	 to	 label	 as	 ‘populist’	 the	more	 politicised	 and	
reform‐oriented	 tradition	 of	 research	 and	 theorising	 around	 white	 collar	 crime	 initiated	 by	
Sutherland.	 For	 once	 the	 intent	 behind	 the	 label	 was	 not	 pejorative.	 They	 contrast	 this	 with	
what	 they	 call	 the	 ‘patrician’	 perspective,	 a	more	 conservative,	 narrower,	 legalistic	 approach	
favoured	 by	 a	 later	 generation	 of	 criminologists,	 whose	 ranks	 and	 influence	 were	
(unsurprisingly)	enhanced	by	more	generous	funding	pipelines.		
	
The	answer	given	by	the	‘patricians’	to	Sutherland’s	question	–	is	white	collar	crime,	crime?	–	is	
‘no,	not	unless	it	is	prosecuted	as	such’.	This	begs	the	question	of	why	it	is	typically	only	small‐
time	 transgressors	 who	 are	 prosecuted	 for	 economic	 crimes	 and	 thus	 become	 the	 exclusive	
subjects	 of	 research	 in	 the	 ‘patrician’	 tradition.	 This	 approach	 reflects,	 as	 it	 reproduces,	 the	
‘ambiguity’	 surrounding	white	 collar	 and	 corporate	 crimes.	 But	 ambiguity	 is	 not	 an	 inherent	
quality	 of	 conduct:	 it	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 how	 conduct	 is	 legally	 defined	 and	 processed,	 how	 it	 is	
constructed	in	media	and	political	discourse,	and	so	on.	Punitive	criminal	law	seeks	to	speak	to	
us	 all,	 as	members	 of	 a	 civic	 community	 who	 carry	 certain	 general	moral	 obligations	 to	 our	
fellow	citizens	(Duff	2012).	It	condemns	and	punishes	conduct	on	behalf	of	the	community	as	a	
whole	because	the	conduct	is	regarded	as	violating	fundamental	moral	norms	upon	which	civic	
life	is	held	to	depend.	Punitive	law	has	an	overwhelmingly	normative	and	moral	character	and	
purpose.	Such	legal	rituals	(which	are	crucially	moral	and	political	also)	are	only	exceptionally	
enacted	against	white	collar	and	corporate	offending,	as	the	GFC	amply	demonstrates.		
	
More	 typical	 are	 civil	 and	 regulatory	 sanctions	 (although	 sparing	 use	 is	 often	made	 even	 of	
these	 laws).	They	tend	to	be	morally	neutral:	 less	concerned	with	the	 individual	violation	and	
the	 moral	 status	 of	 its	 perpetrator	 than	 with	 modulating	 the	 overall	 level	 of	 the	 activity	 in	
question	or	compensating	for	harm.	Cases	are	often	settled	or	disposed	of	administratively	or	in	
low‐key	 legal	 proceedings	 and	 usually	 away	 from	 the	 glare	 of	 publicity.	 Strict	 liability	 is	
common,	although	the	effect	of	this	is	often	to	obscure	the	actual	presence	of	moral	culpability	
rather	than	simply	weaken	legal	requirements	to	prove	guilt.	The	predominance	of	monetised	
justice	 –	 fines,	 civil	 damages,	 civil	 penalties	 –	 serves	 also	 to	 blur	 the	 line	 between	 civil	 and	
criminal	 (O’Malley	 2009).	 Imposing	 a	 price	 on	 wrongdoing	 assimilates	 sanctions	 to	 the	
generalised	monetary	circuits	of	capitalist	society,	making	it	just	another	cost	of	doing	business	
and	diluting,	if	not	effacing,	its	moral	status.		
	
Kit	 Carson’s	 path‐breaking	 historical	 and	 empirical	 research	 on	 factory	 crimes	 and	 their	
enforcement	showed	how	in	Britain	these	crimes	became	‘conventionalized’;	that	is	to	say,	how	
certain	legal	wrongs	involving	the	manufacturing	class	came	to	enjoy	substantial	immunity	from	
the	criminal	 law,	how	 their	 status	was	 transformed	 into	not	being	 ‘real	 crimes’	 at	 all	 (Carson	
1979;	 1971).	 He	 refers	 to	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 advent	 of	 industrial	
capitalism	 led	 to	 a	 ‘restructuring	of	 the	economy	of	 illegalities’	 (1977).	A	more	extensive	and	
strictly	enforced	regime	of	criminal	laws	and	disciplinary	punishments	(with	the	penitentiary	at	
its	centre)	was	directed	at	working	class	crimes,	many	of	which	had	in	the	past	not	been	crimes	
at	 all	 or,	 if	 illegal,	 enjoyed	 a	 broad	 immunity	 based	 on	 popularly	 entrenched	 notions	 of	
customary	 right	 (for	 example,	 in	 relation	 to	 hunting	 and	 fishing	 on	 common	 lands).	 New	
categories	of	theft,	draconian	punishments	and	eventually	new	models	of	policing	were	enlisted	
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in	campaigns	to	repress	the	old	customary	rights.	The	new	crimes	enacted	under	factory	laws,	
however,	rather	quickly	had	their	criminal	status	diluted,	were	exempted	from	punitive	law	and	
made	subject	to	a	very	different	regime	of,	at	best,	 light‐touch	controls.	Rather	than	reflecting	
some	 natural	 order	 of	 things,	 the	 ‘institutionalisation	 of	 ambiguity’	 was	 the	 historically	
contingent	outcome	of	legal	and	political	struggles,	campaigns	and	conflict.		
	
Sutherland	 was	 certainly	 alert	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 response	 to	 white	 collar	 and	
corporate	crime	(of	the	law,	government,	news	media)	shaped	public	moral	sentiments	rather	
than	merely	reflecting	them.	In	the	‘patrician’	perspective,	the	wrongdoing	of	corporations	and	
wealthy	 businesspeople	 is	 safely	 sealed	 off	 from	 the	 sort	 of	 emotional	 fervour	 and	 overt	
moralising	stirred	by	penal	populism	in	respect	of	other	crimes.	It	is	firmly	contained	within	a	
sanitised	administrative	logic	devoid	of	moral	and	political	content.	The	taken‐for‐granted	basis	
for	this	 is	that	corporate	and	white	collar	harms	are	embedded	in	 legitimate	market	practices	
and	processes	which	provide	the	essential	foundations	of	economic	life.	Regulation	should	not	
interfere	 with	 the	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 resources	 in	 a	 market	 economy.	 That	 market	
mechanisms	 tend	 towards	 a	 self‐sustaining	 equilibrium	provides	 a	 convenient	 frame	 through	
which	to	explain	(away)	facts	 like	the	substantial	screening	out	of	so	much	of	this	crime	from	
the	criminal	 justice	system,	the	failure	of	government	bureaux	to	collect	and	publicise	data	on	
these	criminal	activities,	and	so	on.	Those	who	question	legal	definitions	and	the	selective	role	
of	the	criminal	justice	system	with	respect	to	economic	crimes	are	frequently	accused	of	being	
unscientific	and	politically	motivated,	an	apologia	that	goes	back	to	Paul	Tappan’s	response	to	
Sutherland	 (Tappan	 1970).	 It	 is	 also	 held	 to	 be	 imperative	 that	 the	 ‘spill‐over’	 effects	 and	
externalities	 of	 corporate	 punishment	 (collateral	 costs	 borne	 by	 innocent	 shareholders,	
employees	and	consumers)	be	avoided	(see,	for	example,	Coffee	1981),	a	calculus	that	has	never	
enjoyed	much	currency	where	the	punishment	of	 lower‐class	crime	was	concerned.	There	is	a	
‘spill‐over’	 effect	 but	 it	 works	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction	 to	 the	 one	 Coffee	 referred	 to:	 the	
supposed	 legitimacy	 and	 productive	 character	 of	 business	 activity	 routinely	 shields	 business	
wrongdoing	 from	 scrutiny	 and	 censure.	 There	 is	 a	 particular	 irony	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	
financial	 sector	 as	 so	much	of	 its	 activity,	 in	 areas	 like	derivatives	 for	 example,	 is	of	 doubtful	
productive	value	to	the	real	economy,	whether	or	not	it	is	conducted	in	a	wholly	legal	manner.		
In	 characteristic	 populist	 fashion,	 the	 Occupy	movement	 has	 sought	 to	 turn	 this	 on	 its	 head:	
outrage	at	unpunished	financial	abuses	has	focussed	attention	more	widely	and	more	deeply	on	
the	 inner	 workings	 of	 the	 contemporary	 economic	 and	 political	 order,	 on	 links	 between	
financial	criminality	and	‘normal’	financial	practices,	and	on	how	economic	and	political	power	
placed	 bankers	 above	 the	 law.	 Evidence	 of	wrongdoing	 is	 used	 to	 cast	 a	 longer	 shadow.	 The	
lexicon	 of	 crime	 and	 criminal	 censure	 was	 widely	 used	 by	 the	 early	 populists	 in	 the	 US	 to	
describe	 the	powerful	 corporate	 interests	 that	 victimised	 small	 farmers,	wage	workers,	 trade	
unions	and	political	activists	(see,	 for	example,	Geis	2011:	6).	This	was	mirrored	in	Australian	
labour	populism’s	militant	 criticism	of	 the	 excesses	 of	 ‘the	money	power’	 (the	 banks,	 finance	
capital	 and	 their	 political	 allies)	 dating	 from	 the	 same	 time.	 The	 rhetoric	 of	 crime	 and	
accusations	of	moral	turpitude	pervaded	descriptions	of	the	money	power	in	the	 labour	press	
and	 in	 radical	 analysis.	 They	 were	 regularly	 depicted	 as	 robbers,	 fraudsters,	 swindlers,	 and	
conspirators	 whose	 crimes	 went	 unpunished	 whilst	 the	 crimes	 of	 their	 victims	 –	 crimes	 of	
poverty	 and	desperation	 –	were	met	with	 the	 full	 force	of	 the	 law.	This	was	 accompanied	by	
demands	to	prosecute	financiers	and	their	political	colluders	if	it	was	not	to	be	said	that	there	
was	one	law	for	the	rich	and	another	for	the	poor	(Love	1984:	23‐26).		
	
As	critics	of	populism	correctly	point	out,	this	involves	gross	simplification	–	reducing	a	complex	
social	and	economic	system	to	a	conspiracy	on	the	part	of	a	small	clique	of	capitalists.	But	this	is	
somewhat	beside	the	point.	Criminal	labels	always	abstract	and	simplify.	As	populist	signifiers,	
they	 are	 effective	because	 of	 this	 –	because	 they	 provide	 an	 impressive	 stock	 of	 symbols	 and	
meanings	 that	 are	widely	 accessible	 and	provide	 a	 clear	 focus	 for	mobilising	 and	 channelling	
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discontent.	 Critics	 of	 Australian	 labour	 populism	 (like	 Peter	 Love)	 were	 nevertheless	 led	 to	
acknowledge	the	kernel	of	truth	in	populist	depictions	of	capitalist	behaviour.		
	
The	 law	 is	one	of	 the	 fundamental	mechanisms	 through	which	 a	 society	 seeks	 to	organise	 its	
collective	life	and	give	expression	to	its	shared	norms	and	values.	As	Durkheim	(1964)	(amongst	
others)	stressed,	 the	punitive	 function	and	aspect	of	 law	(and	hence	the	criminal	 law)	plays	a	
vital	role	in	this	because	it	concerns	the	most	fundamental	of	these	norms	and	values,	tapping	
most	 deeply	 into	 and	 energising	 the	 psychic,	 cultural,	 and	 social	 life	 of	 society.	 It	 should	 not	
surprise,	then,	that	discourses	around	crime	and	punishment	are	so	often	emotive,	visceral	and	
polarising.	It	is	one	of	the	principal	sites	in	which	the	moral	politics	of	society	are	conducted	and	
in	which	popular	investments	are	most	prolific	and	passionately	felt.		
	
The	 currency	of	populist	 law	and	order	politics	 is	 no	more	 than	 a	 reflection	of	 these	psycho‐
social	 and	political	 dynamics.	Whilst	 for	 some	decades	 it	has	been	attached	 to	a	 conservative	
law	and	order	agenda,	the	times	may	favour	a	different	sort	of	populism	more	in	keeping	with	
the	 focus	 of	 earlier	 progressive	 populist	moments	 on	 questions	 of	 inequality,	 power	 and	 the	
transgressions	of	the	wealthy	rather	than	only	those	of	the	poor	and	marginal.		
	
Concluding	comments	
The	 crusade	 of	 the	 new	 right	 to	 overturn	 the	 New	Deal	 order	 in	 the	 US	 rested	 on	 a	 twofold	
imperative:	to	free	markets	in	order	to	reward	and	encourage	enterprise;	and	to	strengthen	the	
law	 so	 that	 individuals	 were	 made	 to	 bear	 the	 responsibility	 for	 harming	 others	 and	 given	
incentives	to	avoid	doing	so.		
	
A	society	in	which	businesses	have	become	too	big	to	fail	and	individuals	too	powerful	to	gaol	
regardless	of	how	badly	 they	perform	or	how	much	harm	they	cause	 is	one	 in	which	markets	
and	the	legal	process	have	been	distorted	out	of	shape.	This	involves	a	complete	breakdown	in	
notions	 of	 personal	 responsibility,	 reward	 for	 enterprise,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 democracy.	 It	
shows	that	gross	inequality,	and	the	‘winner‐takes‐all’	politics	it	produces,	is	inconsistent	with	
upholding	these	notions.	The	free	market	ideologues	whose	policies	delivered	soaring	economic	
and	social	inequalities	delivered	the	very	opposite	of	what	they	promised.		
	
Commentators	 across	 a	 broad	political	 spectrum	 seem	 to	 share	 these	 concerns	 (cf	 Fukuyama	
2012).	 Even	 that	 venerable	 global	 beacon	 of	 free	 market	 thought,	 The	 Economist	 magazine,	
recently	mounted	a	sustained	assault	on	growing	inequalities	throughout	the	world,	seeking	a	
new	progressive	politics	centred	on	attacking	monopolies	and	vested	interests,	providing	social	
support	 for	 the	 poor	 and	 the	 young	 and	 reforming	 taxes.	 In	 the	 rich	 world,	 The	 Economist	
concluded,	‘Scandinavia	is	the	most	inventive	region’	(2012:	14)	and	‘the	next	supermodel’	(The	
Economist	2013:	9).	
	
Such	an	acknowledgment	makes	you	wonder	whether	the	shibboleths	of	free	market	capitalism	
may	 be	 crumbling.	 The	 Scandinavian	 social	 democracies	 are	 high	 taxing	 and	 high	 spending	
states.	By	the	lights	of	free	market	enthusiasts	they	are	well	down	‘the	road	to	serfdom’.	Almost	
by	any	measure,	however,	they	benefit	economically	(as	well	as	socially)	from	their	rejection	of	
the	 free	market	 faith	 in	 favour	 of	 a	mixed	 economy	 and	 a	 strong	 role	 for	 government.	 They	
invest	 generously	 in	 the	 skills,	 health	 and	 social	well‐being	 of	 their	 citizens.	As	well	 as	 being	
socially	 inclusive,	 they	 are	 the	most	 productive	 and	 prosperous	 societies	 in	 the	 world.	 They	
happen	to	be	the	least	punitive	societies	too	(Pratt	and	Eriksson	2013;	Currie	2013).	Although	
not	without	problems,	 they	show	that	 the	degree	of	 inequality	a	society	 tolerates	and	 fosters,	
and	how	much	and	who	 it	punishes,	 are	not	 dictated	by	 the	 invisible	hand	of	 the	market	but	
involve	political	questions	and	choices.		
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